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I. Plaintiffs Were Required to Bring an Accounting Action as a 
Prerequisite to Suit. 
Under the general rule, "[PJartners may not maintain actions at law among 
themselves regarding partnership business until after the partnership is wound up 
and an accounting is performed." Mays v. Davis, 967 P.2d 275, 277 (Idaho 
1998). This Court recognized this rule in Wanlass v. D Land Title. 790 P.2d 568, 
572 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Likewise, this state has long recognized the principle. 
See. Graham v. Street. 270 P.2d 456, 459-60 (Utah 1954). 
A. No Exception Eliminates the Accounting Requirement In this 
Case. 
While acknowledging the general rule requiring accountings in partnership 
disputes, Plaintiffs argue that exceptions excuse them from the requirement. 
These exceptions are not applicable under the facts of this case. 
For example, Plaintiffs cite Wanlass for the principle that where one partner 
wrongfully dissolves a partnership, the excluded partner can elect his remedy, 
including a suit for damages, which foregoes an accounting action. Wanlass in 
turn relies on Jeaness v. Besnilian. 706 P.2d 143,145 (Nev. 1985). However, the 
language of that exception presents an excluded partner merely with alternatives 
he may sue in contract for specific performance and accounting, or he can sue 
in tort for damages. ]d- Here, Plaintiffs were granted judgment for breach of 
1 
contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and conversion,1 all causes of action 
stemming from, and tied directly to the partnership agreement. All tort claims 
Plaintiffs raised have been dismissed. Having elected their legal remedy, which 
of necessity must specifically enforce the agreements in order to provide relief, 
Plaintiffs were required to seek a legal accounting as a precondition to suit. 
Wanlass. at 572. 
Plaintiffs also cite select cases espousing an exception to the accounting 
rule for cases not involving complex accounting issues. Utah has not adopted 
this exception and this case would not be an appropriate vehicle to do so. 
Moreover, this case demonstrates that even so -called simple cases would be 
better served by the long-standing accounting requirement. 
In Plaintiffs view, this case boils down to a sum of money divided by three. 
However, Plaintiffs' very Complaint demonstrates that this reasoning is overly 
simplistic for this matter. Far from being a case devoid of complex issues, 
Plaintiffs Complaint alleged nine causes of action including breach of contract, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary 
duty, mesne profits, conversion, fraud, conspiracy to convert and defraud, 
fraudulent conveyance, and accounting and constructive trust. Indeed, Plaintiffs 
seem to have acknowledged the need for an accounting by seeking one in their 
1While a conversion action would generally sound in tort, in this matter 
there is no conversion absent the partnership and trust agreements, which placed 
the responsibility on Defendants to transfer an interest in the property to Plaintiffs. 
2 
Complaint. 
Moreover, the Plaintiffs fail to recognize the significant details need to 
arrive at the deceptively simple sum at the heart of their complaint. This is 
evidenced by the errors in Plaintiffs' judgment. The judgment awarded damages 
to Plaintiffs based solely on the final sale price of the property and without regard 
to various closing costs, marketing costs, or other costs incurred by the 
partnership incident to the transaction. The judgment also failed to take into 
consideration other expenses incurred by Defendants personally on the property, 
which should have been offset against any division of profits. Had any 
accounting action been filed these issues would already have been ascertained. 
The judgment, as it stands, is in error. 
Indeed, the accounting requirement comports with Utah's strong public 
policy of alternative dispute resolution. See. Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 b-3. By 
proceeding with the accounting requirement, disputing partners are better able to 
ascertain the nature of their positions and are better able to negotiate and resolve 
their claims without costly and protracted litigation, which taxes the resources of 
the judiciary. When litigation is needed, an accounting greatly reduces the 
expense and time necessary to make a determination of issues. 
In this case, Plaintiffs opposition to the accounting requirement reflects 
nothing more than their willful ignorance of their own legal and financial interests 
in the dozen or so years after the transfer of the property and termination of 
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distributions. Having failed to bring an accounting action, Plaintiffs had no 
standing to maintain the case at bar. The judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed. 
B. Plaintiffs Accounting Request In the Instant Action Was 
Untimely and Ineffective. 
Under Utah Code Ann. §48-1-40, "[t]he right to an account of his interest 
shall accrue to any partner or his legal representative as against the winding-up 
or the surviving partners or the person or partnership continuing the business, at 
the date of dissolution in the absence of any agreement to the contrary." 
Accordingly, when dissolution occurs, the statute of limitations for an accounting 
begins to toll. In their previous brief, Defendants pointed to a number of 
instances where dissolution occurred as a matter of law. In response, Plaintiffs 
contend that the partnership agreement was somehow modified by agreement 
when Defendants allegedly continued to treat Plaintiffs as partners. 
Plaintiffs' argument is not in accord with the plain language of the 
partnership agreement, which states "This Partnership Agreement shall continue 
until the Contract of Purchase has been paid in full or until terminated or modified 
by unanimous agreement of the parties hereto." By its plain terms, the 
partnership terminated when the purchase contract was paid in full absent 
unanimous agreement of the parties. Plaintiffs can not point to any agreement, 
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unanimous or otherwise, to continue the partnership. See. Prince. Yeates. and 
Geldzahler v. Young. 2004 UT 26,1f13, 94 P.3d 179 (Meeting of the minds is 
essential to form a contract or agreement); Harris v. IES Assoc. Inc.. 2003 UT 
App 112,1146, 69 P.3d 297 (Valid modification requires meeting of the minds); 
Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George. 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 
1995)(Burden of proof for showing modification is on party claiming modification). 
Likewise, Defendants' business actions are not inconsistent with the 
winding up of business affairs. Arie Reyns' deposition testimony reflected that 
the partnership had been considering the sale of the apartments from the late 
1970's on. (Exhibit A, Deposition of Arie Reyns, p. 17.) Consistent with that 
objective, a loan was taken out later on to make necessary repairs to the 
property. And even had that loan been on behalf of the partnership, while a 
partner generally can't incur debts for the partnership during the winding-up 
phase, as a general rule, "A liquidating partner has power to incur debts or other 
obligations necessary for the reasonable preservation of the partnership assets or 
in procuring a favorable market for their disposal." See. Tellier, L.S., Annotation: 
Powers of Liquidating Partner with Respect to Incurring of Obligations, 60 
A.L.R.2d 826, §12(a) (1958-2004). In this case, the loan was taken out to make 
repairs to the roof, and Plaintiffs fail to mention that the loan was not taken out in 
the name of the partnership, but was taken out by Defendants, with their home as 
collateral. (Exhibit A, Deposition of Arie Reyns, p. 28.) 
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In the same manner complying with tax laws by issuing K-1 forms or 
changing the books to reflect capital account adjustments is completely 
consistent with winding-down a business. Plaintiffs do not point to any action by 
any of the other partners to constitute an agreement to continue the partnership 
in spite of the partnership agreement. Accordingly, dissolution took place on a 
number of occasions, with the latest being in 1988 at the death of Ellen Isom. 
Plaintiffs action for accounting in 1997 was untimely filed, and having now been 
dismissed, was of no effect. The trial court's judgment should be reversed and 
Plaintiffs' claims dismissed. 
II. The Discovery Rule Does Not Toll the Application of the Statute of 
Limitations. 
By arguing the applicability of the discovery rule, Plaintiffs implicitly 
acknowledge that their claims are subject to statutes of limitation. Plaintiffs 
depend on the discovery rule to proceed with their claims. In turn, in the absence 
of the discovery rule, Plaintiffs claims must fail, as Plaintiffs Complaint was filed 
more than a dozen years after the events giving rise to the causes of action. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[ujnder the discovery rule, a 
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff learns of, or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of, the facts that give rise to 
the cause of action." Olsen v. Hoolev. 865 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Utah 
6 
1993)(Emphasis added). The question of whether a plaintiff was reasonably 
diligent so as to trigger the discovery rule is ordinarily a question of fact for the 
trier of fact. See, Safsten v. LPS Social Services. Inc.. 942 P.2d 949, 953 (Utah 
1997). Accordingly, even if the discovery rule applies in this matter as Plaintiffs 
contend, the statute of limitations begins to toll as soon as one of the Plaintiffs, in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the facts giving rise 
to these claims. 
Plaintiffs contend that the statute of limitations was tolled in this matter 
under either a concealment theory or an exceptional circumstances theory. See. 
Berenda v. Lanaford. 914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996). However, Plaintiffs do not 
meet the requirements for the concealment exception, and there are no 
exceptional circumstances in this case. 
A. Fraudulent Concealment 
Under the fraudulent concealment version of the discovery rule, a court 
makes "a determination of (i) when a plaintiff would reasonably be on notice to 
inquire into a defendant's wrongdoing despite the defendant's efforts to conceal 
it; and (ii) whether a plaintiff, would reasonably have, with due diligence, 
discovered the facts causing the basis of the cause of action despite the 
defendant's efforts to conceal those facts." Berenda. at 52. If a plaintiff should 
have inquired and would have discovered the facts forming the basis for the 
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cause of action with due diligence, the discovery rule does not apply. Indeed, the 
Utah Supreme Court has quoted with approval the following: 
Means of knowledge and knowledge itself, are in legal effect, the same 
thing where there is enough to put a party on inquiry. Knowledge which 
one has or ought to have under the circumstances is imputed to him.... In 
other words, whatever fairly puts a person on inquiry is sufficient notice 
where the means of knowledge are at hand; and if he omits to inquire, he is 
then chargeable with all the facts which, by a proper inquiry, he might have 
ascertained. A person has no right to shut his eyes or his ears to avoid 
information, and then say that he had no notice; he does wrong not to heed 
the 'signs and signals' seen by him. It will not do to remain willfully ignorant 
of a thing readily ascertainable, and it is no excuse for failure to make an 
inquiry, that if made, it might have failed to develop the truth. 
Salt Lake. Garfield & Western Railway Co. v. Allied Materials Co.. 291 P.2d 883, 
885-86 (Utah 1955), citing. 39 Am. Jur. §12, pp. 238-40. 
While Plaintiffs acknowledge the limitations of this rule, they recite a string 
of excuses for their ignorance. Under Plaintiffs' view, because the parties are 
family, the absence of delivery of deeds, curtailment of partnership distributions, 
and refusal to provide partnership information was all understandable. In fact, it 
is at best a stretch to justify Plaintiffs' ignorance under the guise of family. 
Indeed, Ruth Reyns testified at her deposition that she rarely saw any of the 
Plaintiffs, except when it was time for them to collect their money. (Exhibit B, 
Deposition of Ruth Reyns, pp. 125-26.) Moreover, there are a number of facts 
that demonstrate that with the exercise of reasonable diligence, Plaintiffs would 
and should have discovered the facts giving rise to these claims, but instead 
decided to ignore their rights. 
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Under the trust agreement, signed by both Plaintiff Shirlie Charlesworth 
and Defendant Ruth Reyns in conjunction with the partnership, Shirlie 
Charlesworth, as trustee, was required to terminate the affairs of the trust upon 
the later happening either of her children reaching the age of twenty-one (21) or 
upon the termination of contract payments and obligation to Ben and Margaret 
Charlesworth. Amongst her responsibilities in terminating the trust, was to 
distribute any money remaining as trust principal to the beneficiaries, as well as 
to convey to each of them their 1/5 share of the real property in the trust. 
Furthermore, as her children's trustee, Plaintiff Shirlie Charlesworth had a duty of 
safekeeping to protect the trust's interests in the trust assets. 
Shirlie Charlesworth never received the deed conveying any interest in the 
real property to the trust. Once the contract was paid, it was incumbent upon her, 
as trustee, and subsequently upon her children, to determine just what happened 
to the property so the trust could be appropriately terminated. All of the children 
had reached 21 by the time the payments were made to Ben and Margaret 
Charlesworth. 
At that time, in 1983, a simple call to the County Recorder's office would 
have revealed that Ruth Reyns recorded the deed conveying a 2/3 interest in the 
property to herself. The same visit would have shown that Plaintiffs' interest in 
the property was not recorded. This information alone should have alerted 
Plaintiffs to the need for an accounting and subsequent steps to protect their 
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interest in the partnership property. Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, it was not 
their obligation to check the public records every few months to see what was 
transpiring with partnership property. It was the trustee's obligation to perform 
her duty and see that the Trust Agreement was terminated as provided by its 
terms, and to see that the provisions of the various agreements calling for 
delivery of a Quitclaim Deed from Ruth Reyns to the trust were complied with. 
Indeed, Plaintiff Shirlie Charlesworth was given the trust documents in 
1963. In her capacity as trustee, she was the only Plaintiff who was ever a 
partner in Ruell Investment Co. The claims of the remaining Plaintiffs, Shirlie 
Charlesworth's children, are all derivative of her rights as trustee. Moreover, 
Shirlie Charlesworth was on notice of her obligations from the inception of the 
deal. Given the circumstances, Plaintiffs were on reasonable inquiry notice from 
1983 on, when Shirlie Charlesworth should have transferred her interest as 
trustee to her children, and as such the discovery rule does not toll any statutes 
of limitation. 
In addition, according to Rennly Charlesworth's deposition testimony, in 
1988, one of his sisters wrote a letter requesting an accounting after distributions 
were cut off. The only response received was a Christmas card, with a "curt" 
note chastising them for questioning the integrity of their aunt. Had the Plaintiffs 
exercised reasonable diligence at that time, they would have inquired further, 
regardless of whether the managing partner was family - an aunt they hadn't 
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seen in years. In this case, subsequent to 1985, Plaintiffs received no 
substantive distributions, but did receive K-1s, which reflected increases to capital 
accounts for which they were taxed and received nothing. Reasonable 
individuals under those circumstances would have inquired as to why they were 
incurring tax obligations while their income was being cut off. Had Plaintiffs made 
a legal demand for an accounting or done reasonable investigation of the 
property issues at that time, the public record was plain to show the deeds that 
were executed. Plaintiffs cannot remain willfully ignorant, ignoring the signs, and 
then claim they had no way to know. 
In 1983, had Plaintiffs inquired following the dissolution of the partnership 
by termination of the contract payments, they would have seen that no interest in 
the partnership property had been conveyed to them. This was the very time, 
Plaintiff Shirlie Charlesworth should have been acting to protect that interest 
under the trust. 
In 1985, had Plaintiffs been seeking to protect their interest and terminate 
the trust, they would have seen that Defendants had transferred the 2/3 interest 
to their family trust. The same holds true had Plaintiffs made reasonable inquiry 
at any time after they stopped receiving payments from the partnership after 
1985. 
In 1988, had Plaintiffs inquired following the death of partner Ellen Isom, 
the would have seen all of Defendant's actions, which were a matter of public 
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record. At no time, during this period did Plaintiffs act. Given that summary 
judgment was granted in Plaintiffs favor, the factual inferences regarding inquiry 
notice should be reviewed in the light most favorable to Defendants. When the 
facts are seen in that light, it is apparent that Plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of 
the facts giving rise to their claims no later than 1988. The statute of limitations 
had tolled prior to the filing of their Complaint in 1997. 
B. Exceptional Circumstances 
Plaintiffs assert that under Snow v. Rudd. 998 P.2d 262 (Utah 2000), the 
statute of limitations is tolled until 1994, when Defendants specifically stated that 
the partnership was "over." In Rudd. the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
applying the balancing test for "exceptional circumstances" under the discovery 
rule, the actions of a trustee of a trust will not trigger the running of the statute of 
limitations until the beneficiary has either a "clear indication" of what has occurred 
or must be charged with knowledge of the actions, id. at 266. Notwithstanding 
Plaintiffs erroneous citation to Utah partnership law,2 the Supreme Court's 
holding has not extended this rule to every relationship where positions of trust 
are involved. Nor is this the "close family relationship,"that Snow had in mind. 
2Defendant cites Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-8 for the proposition that a partner 
has a duty to hold profits from partnership property as a trustee for other partners. 
That section binds the partnership by an admission of one of its partners. 
Nevertheless, Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-18 does stand for the principal Plaintiffs 
rely upon. 
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Indeed, given that the facts Plaintiff allege raise specific issues as to whether the 
concealment theory applies, it would seem that this case presents the antithesis 
of "exceptional circumstances." 
However, in determining whether "exceptional circumstances" exist, the 
courts employ a balancing test - weighing the hardship imposed upon a plaintiff 
by the statute of limitation against the prejudice resulting to the defendant from 
the passage of time. See. Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah. 902 P.2d 
629, 636 (Utah 1993). Specifically, the Plaintiffs burden must be weighed 
against the Defendant's inability to call witnesses, locate evidence, and recollect 
events. Id. 
In this case, the hardship imposed upon Plaintiff is one of their own 
making. As previously set forth, had Plaintiffs simply performed their legal 
obligations in relation to the trust, Defendant's intentions would have been 
discovered in 1983. Had Plaintiffs made reasonable inquiry when confronted with 
the absence of any deed protecting their interest, the absence of distributions, 
and the absence of Defendants' willingness to provide an accounting when 
requested, all the public records would have been plain to see in 1988. But 
Plaintiffs chose to close their eyes and ears to what they were seeing. 
In 1997, Plaintiff Rennly Charlesworth went to an attorney, explained the 
situation, and forthwith learned of the property transactions. (Exhibit C, 
Deposition of Rennly Charlesworth, pp. 8-9.) There was no reason he should not 
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be charged with the responsibility to make that very inquiry back in 1983, 1985, or 
1988. Had the Plaintiffs done so, the statute of limitations would not be an issue. 
This case is not unlike the circusmtances in Leqqroan v. Zion's Savings 
Bank & Trust Co.. 232 P.2d 746 (Utah 1951). In Leqqroan. the payments to trust 
beneficiaries became smaller and less frequent with time. As the years passed, 
no demand for accounting was made of the trust, nor inquiry into the status of its 
winding-up period. In considering the limitations period, the court wrote, "We do 
not say just how many years after [the last payment] this constructive notice came 
to the cestuis but we do say that to have three or four years after the last known 
payment... without demanding an accounting or statement from the [trustee] was 
unreasonable." ]d- at 750. 
Any hardship that has resulted for Plaintiff, has come about because of 
their own lack of interest. Plaintiffs stopped receiving payments after 1985, yet 
didn't make any serious effort to inquire concerning their rights until 12 years later 
- over triple the time the Leqqroan court found to be unreasonable. These 
hardships reflect inattentiveness on the part of Plaintiffs and don't outweigh the 
burdens placed upon Defendants in having to raise a defense of actions that took 
place several years back. Witnesses are now dead, partnership records 
destroyed, and recollections limited. 
The "exceptional circumstances" discovery rule should not be applied in 
this case. And even assuming arguendo that the balancing test weighs in favor 
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of applying the rule, Plaintiffs should still be charged with knowledge they would 
have discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence. This is especially so 
given the standard of review, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to 
Defendants, the losing party on summary judgment. Accordingly, the statute of 
limitations began to toll at the latest in 1988. The instant actions were time-
barred. The district court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed. 
Conclusion 
Under the law, an accounting is a prerequisite to an intra-partnership suit. 
Plaintiffs did not seek such an accounting prior to pursuing the instant claims, and 
their cause of action filed herewith was untimely, having not been timely filed 
following a number of possible dissolution dates, and of no effect, having been 
subsequently dismissed at Plaintiffs' behest. Likewise, Plaintiffs' other causes of 
action were time barred. The discovery rule does not apply in this case because 
Plaintiffs are properly charged with the knowledge of facts that were plain to be 
seen had they performed their legal duties arising from the trust and protecting 
their financial interests. The trial court improperly granted summary judgment in 
this matter and its decision should be reversed. 
15 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Brad C. Snffit 
H. Thomas Stevenson 
Benjamin C Rasmussen 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this ^ u day of January, 2005,1 mailed, 
postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to the 
following individuals: 
Arthur B. Berger 
Carolynn Clark 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 




Ruell Investment August 27, 1985 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLIE J. CHARLESWORTH, 
JACK G. CHARLESWORTH, 
RENNLY J. CHARLESWORTH, 
JACE MARTINSON, GAYLEE 
C. McEWAN.andMIRID 
WEIDNER, all individuals,) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RUELL INVESTMENT CO., a 
) 
) 
) Civil No.: 980901451 
) 
) Deposition of: 




Utah general partnership,) 
RUTH C. REYNS, RAYMOND E.) 
ISOM. COLLEEN RUTH ISOM 
FINDLEY, and PATRICK ISOM,) 
all individuals, and ARIE) 
WILLIAM REYNS, RUTH C. 
REYNS, and ALAN W. REYNS,) 
as Joint Trustees under 
Trust Agreement dated 




























BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 22nd day 
of April, 1999, the deposition of WILLIAM REYNS 
was taken before Marsha Romney, a Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for 
the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 3:15 
p.m. of said day at the law office of Stevenson & 





























For the Plaintiffs: Arthur B. Berger 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
For the Defendants: Brad C. Smith 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
2605 Washington Blvd. 
Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 






By Mr. Berger 4 
By Mr. Smith 39 
EXHIBITS 
25 Letter from A. William Reyns 




called as a witness by and on behalf of the 
plaintiffs, being first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
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EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BERGER: 
Q: Mr. Reyns, let me start out by telling 
you some of the things I told Mrs. Reyns at the 
[12] beginning of her deposition, sort of the ground 
[13] rules, a little bit, about what we're doing 
[14] t o d a y 
[15] You've been sworn in and you're 
[16] testifying under oath, which means you have to 
[17] tell the truth just like you would if you were 
[18] testifying before a judge and jury. Do you 
[19] understand that? 
[20] A: Yes,I do. 
[21] Q: You need to answer audibly so the court 
[22] reporter can transcribe your answers. If you 
[23] don't understand one of my questions, please stop 
[24] me, tell me I'm not making sense and ask me to 
[25] rephrase a question. I'll be happy to do that. 
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[1] A: What do you mean? 
[2] Q: I was asking your wife, why did it dawn 
pj on someone and how did it dawn on someone that 
W maybe you didn't have to keep paying the children 
[5] any money, and you just indicated that you looked 
[6] at the will and that's why you went to see Mr 
[7] Kunz? 
(8j A: That's right. 
[9] Q: So it was based on your observation of 
[io] the will that made you and your wife think that 
[11] maybe you didn't have to pay any more money to 
[12] the children? 
[13] A: That's right We were thinking of 
[14] celling it as far along as maybe 20 years ago 
[15] when I retired 
[16] Q: Why were you thinking of selling it? 
[17] A: Well* I am getting — you know 
tie] There's a lot of things you don't do when you're 
m 85 
[20] Q: So there's nothing else that you're 
[21] relying on for your understanding that Ruell 
[22] Investment Company only had to pay a share of 
[23] profits to the children, other than your reading 
[24i of Ben Charlesworth's will and your discussion 
[25] with Mr Kunz? 
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in A: That's correct. 
[2] Q: Now, Mrs Reyns has testified that you 
[3] did not have anything to do with the bookkeeping 
[4] for Ruell Investments, but rather you took care 
[5] of the bookkeeping for Bill Reyns & Son, your 
[6] painting — 
[7] A: That's correct. 
[8] Q: So you didn't have anything to do with 
[9] providing information that Ruell Investment 
[io] Company's accountants used to prepare its tax 
[11] returns, is that correct? 
[12] A: Give me that again. That went over my 
[13] head 
[14] Q: Well, it was a bad question Did you 
[15] provide any of the information to the accountants 
[16] for Ruell Investment Company that they used in 
[17] preparing Ruell Investment Company's partnership 
[18] returns, or was that your wife that would have 
[19] provided that information? 
[20] A: She did most of that. Occasionally if 
[21] Steve had a question that I could answer I did 
[22] Q: You re referring to Steve Johnson? 
[23] A; Yes 
[24] Q: Did you ever talk to Mr Johnson about 
[25] the partnership's status or lack thereof of 
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[1] Shirhe's children? 
[2] A: I can't remember that I did. 
[3] (Whereupon Exhibit Nos 25 and 26 were 
[4} marked tor identification by the court reporter) 
[5j MR. BERGER: Brad, could you pull the 
[6] original Exhibits 3 and 6? 
[7] MR. SMITH: You bet 
[8] Q: BY MR BERGER We'll start with 
[9] Exhibit 3 Have you ever seen this document 
[io] before today? 
[tu A: Looks like it s a description of the 
[12] property 
[13] Q: At the top there is the title 
[H] "Quitclaim Deed " 
[is] A: Yeah 
[16] Q: It states also, "Ruth C Reyns of 
[17] Ogden," I'll skip some, "quitclaims to Shirlie 
[18] Charlesworth, trustee, grantee " 
[19} A: I see it 
[20] Q: Have you ever seen this document before 
[21] today? 
[222 A: No 
[23] Q: Do you have an understanding of what a 
[24] quitclaim deed is? 
[25] A: Yes 
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[1] Q: What is your understanding? 
{2i A: Transfers ownership of the property 
[3] Q: Let's look actually at Exhibit 8, 
[4j another warranty deed Let me ask you, sir, if 
[5] you have seen that document before today? 
lei A: No* I have not 
[7] Q: What is this document m your 
[8] understanding? 
[9j A: Looks like a transfer of property 
[10] Q: States, "Warranty deed" at the top? 
Eiij A: Uh-huh (affirmative) 
[12] Q: And it states also, "Ruth C Reyns," 
[13] I'll skip some, "conveys and warrants to Ane 
[U] William Reyns, Ruth C Reyns, and Alan W Reyns 
[15] as joint trustees " Do you recall that transfer? 
[16} A: I remember her doing it, 
[17] Q: What did she do m your understanding? 
[18} A: She made it so that Ruthie, that's my 
[19] daughter, and my son, Alan William, would be able 
[20] to write checks on our accounts when we died 
[21] Someone would have to be liable for the bills and 
[22] soon 
[23] Q: Did you understand that you obtained a 
[24] share of Ruell Investment Company? 
[25] A: Yes, I did 
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[ij A: No, he didn't. 
[2] Q: Did you ever go to Commercial Secunty 
[3] Bank to pick up documents? 
[4] A: No 
[5] Q: Do you recall ever receiving any 
[6] documents in the mail from Commercial Secunty 
[7] Bank? 
[8j A; No 
[9] Q: No letters or correspondence or 
[io] anything like that? 
[11] A: Returned checks, canceled checks. 
[12] Q: Exhibit 3, which is the quitclaim deed, 
[13] again, do you know whether your wife ever 
[u] received a copy of this? 
£15] A: I don't know 
[16] Q: Do you know whether Shirhe 
[17] Charlesworth ever received a copy of that? 
[18] A: No 
[19] Q: Let me show you what I ve marked as 
[20] Exhibit No 25, please Can you tell me what 
[21] that is? 
[22] A: It's kind of self-explanatory, isn't 
[23} It? 
[24] Q: That's a letter? 
[25] A: Yeah. 
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[1] Q: Did you wnte that letter? 
[2] A: Looks like it. 
[3] Q: Is that your signature at the bottom? 
[4j A: Yes. 
[5] Q: Do you think you wrote the letter on or 
[6] about December 9th of 1988? 
[7] A: That's what it's dated, yes. I think 
[8] SO 
[9] Q: Do you recall anyone ever asking you or 
[io] your wife for any sort of accounting of 
[11] partnership income and expenditures? 
[12] A: No, I don't remember anyone ever asking 
[13] any questions 
[H] Q. The second to last paragraph of this 
[15] letter states, "Because our integrity was 
[16] questioned by some of the trusts I am sending 
[17] this out to all members " What do you recall 
[18] referencing by that statement? 
[19] A: I don't remember 
[20] Q: Do you know what the trust refers to? 
[21] A: No 
[22] Q: Some members of the trust? 
[23] A: I don't remember anything like that 
[24] Do you? 
[25] MRS. REYNS: Huh-uh (negative) | 
Page 27 
[1] THE WITNESS: I can't remember 
[2] Q: BY MR BERGER Would that have been 
[3] the Shirhe Charlesworth trust? 
[4j A: Well, it isn't addressed to her. 
[5] Q: Is it addressed to anyone? 
[6j A: No I can't remember anybody 
[7] question! ag it 
[a] Can you, Ruth? 
[9] MRS. REYNS: No 
[io] Q: BY MR BERGER So you don't recall to 
[11] whom you sent this letter? 
£121 A: No. Says to everybody. 
[13] Q: Do you recall whether or not you or 
[14] your wife provided information about expenditures 
[15] or income of the partnership to anyone? 
[te] A' I think we did a time or two when we 
[17] sent a check in Seems to me, and I am not 
[is] positive on this, but seems to me that I told 
[191 them about the expenses we had on that 
[20] boiler — that was an old boiler — when we took 
[2ii the place over. 
[22] Q: Would you have done that by phone or 
[23] letter? 
[24j A: Probably by letter. 
[25] Q: Was it your usual course of business to 
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[1] send out a letter to people explaining — 
[2i A: No, it wasn't, just if it was something 
[3j unusual.That boiler costs us roughly over 
m $13,000 
[5] Q: It wasn't your habit to just explain 
[6j expenditures that were typical? 
m A; No. 
[8] Q: Only if they were maybe significant in 
[9] amount? 
tioj A: Well, just — occasionally maybe I 
iuy did It wasn t required of us so I didn t do it 
[12] Q: Let me show you what s been marked as 
[13] Exhibit 26, and ask if you can identify that 
[14] A. Well, this is when we were doing the 
[15] roof We ti led to get Ruth's brother-in law to 
[16] sign As a matter of fact, the bank demanded a 
[17] signature from him if we wanted to borrow the 
[is] money on the apartments 
[19] Q: So did you borrow the money on the 
[20] apartments? 
[21] A* No, we borrowed it on my house It 
[22] says here we had a 50-percent vacancy at that 
[23] time 
[24] Q: Now, the two letters that we've 
[25] identified, I believe, as Exhibit 24 and 25 are a 
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HI A: I didn t think they did either, 
[2] Q: So you didn't give them notice? 
[3] A: No, except for talking to Rennly 
[4] afterwards. 
[5] Q: When did you talk to Rennly about the 
[6i sale of the apartments? 
[7j A: I can't remember 
[8] Q: Sometime after the) WCIL ^ i d oi L^IY.IC 
[91 they were sold? 
[ioj A: It was just when he called and I ti 
[til him that they weren't getting any mom 
[12} know that I even told him that we had 
[13] apartments. 
[H] Q: You just told him , _ _
 0—CT ~ 
[15] be sending him any more — 
[is] A: Yeah, and we hadn't sold them then 
[17} either. So I guess I hadn't talked to him after 
[181 we sold them at ail. 
[19] Q: Do you recall eve
 0 . 3 ^ 
[20] Shirlie or Jack's children that you'd sold the 
[21] apartment complex? 
[22] A: I never saw them. The only time I 
[23] heard from them was at Christmastime when it was 
[24j time to disburse the money. 
[25] Q: You never gave them notice you sold the 
HI A: Yes, 
[2] Q: Now, if you look at the bottom of 
[3] what's been Bates numbered as 17 of Exhibit 22, 
[4] is that your signature on the bottom of the 
[5i left-hand corner? 
[6] A: Yes. 
[7] Q: If you'll look at paragraph one on that 
[8] same page, it states, "Ruell Investments, 
[9] (seller) is a partnership, and as such the terms 
[ioj of this offer and acceptance is subject to the 
[11] approval of all partners." Skipping a sentence, 
,[12] it then says, "Final partnership acceptance is 
| [13] contingent upon final written acceptance by all 
[14] partners." 
[is] At the time you signed this document, 
[16] what understanding did you have of what that 
[17] meant? 
It meant that my part of the contract I 
Li»j v-uuid sign for. 
[20] Q: At the time of the sale, did you 
[21] understand that in order to sell the partnership 
[22] property you had to have the consent of the 
[23] partners? 
[24i A; Yes, and I did, Raymond Isom and 
[25] Colleen Findley. 
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[1] apartments? 
[2] A: No . 
[3] Q: You never gave notice to Shirlie that 
[4] you sold them either? 
[5] A: No. Never saw her either. 
[6] Q: I want to show you a couple more 
[7] documents and ask you to identify them quickly. 
[8] You should take your time in reviewing them, but 
[9] what I mean by quickly is that I won't have much 
[io] to ask you about them. 
[11] Do you recognize Exhibit 22? 
[12] A: Yes. 
[13] Q: What is that? 
[i4i A: It's a purchase contract. 
[15] Q: Between whom? 
[161 A: Randon and Julene Lawrence. 
[17] Q: Those are the purchasers of truj 
[18] Chariesworth Apartments? 
[19} A: Uh-huh (affirmative).Then 
[20] Banker and Gary Hatch on thert 
[21] Q: Is this the offer for purchase that 
[22] they made to Chariesworth or to Ruell Investment 
[23] Company to buy the Chariesworth Apartments? 
[24i A: Yes. 
[25] Q: You recognize this document, then? 
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[1] Q: How did you gain the understanding 
[2] that the partners would have to consent to the 
[3] sale of partnership property? 
[5] Q: Did you have a conversation T\ 
[6] anybody that you can recall? 
[7] A: Yes, I had to talk to both of them. We 
[8j had a hard time getting Raymond Isom to sign. 
[9] Q: You had to talk to the other partners? 
[ioj A: Yes. 
[11] Q: But I am just wondering how you came to 
[12] understand that in order to sell the partnership 
[13] property you had to have the consent of the 
[14] partners? 
[15] A; I don't kn< A * ' ™* 
16i understoo; 
ii7] Q: You dun t recall navmg a specific 
[is] conversation with anyone in that regard? 
[i9] A: I called Colleen and Raymond, and 
[20] that's — 
[21] Q: In terms of learning that you couldn't 
[22] sell the partnership property without the other 
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pj RENNLY J . CHARLESWORTH, 
[3] called as a witness by and on behalf of the 
[4] Defendants, having been first duly sworn, 
[5] was examined and testified as follows: 
[6] EXAMINATION 
[7] BY MR. SMITH: 
[8] Q: Mr. Charlesworth, could you state your name for 
[9] the record? 
mo] A: Rennly Jones Charlesworth. 
[11] Q: Where do you live presently? 
[12] A: I live in Sugarhouse, 1850 South 900 East, Salt 
[13] Lake City. 
[14] Qi You've been present during the deposition of your 
[15] mother; is that correct? 
[16] A: Correct. 
[17] Q: You heard me discuss with her the events that 
ma] occurred involving Ruell Investment and some apartments in 
[19] Ogden in 1963? 
[20] A: Correct. 
[21] Q: If I understand it correctly you were about eight 
[22] or nine years old? 
[23] A: I think I was nine. 
[24] Q: Do you have any recollection of any oi 
[25] events that I reviewed with your mother? 
Page 3 
ill A: I just remember hearing probably at the dinner 
[2] table that we were now part owners of these apartment courts 
[3] up in Ogden and that there would be a trust for our benefit. 
Qi Do you recall whether that would have been in 
[5] 1963 or just during your childhood years sometime? 
[6] A: Just by perusing over the papers I know it was in 
[7] 63 and I was nine years old. Do I recall it, not really. 
[8] Q: What is the first time you ever recall receiving 
[9] any money from Bill or Ruth Reyns from these apartments? 
[10] A: It was probably in 1963.1 think what was done 
pi 1 ] originally is as I recall we would get a $50 check for us to 
[12] spend on clothes or something for school and then the rest 
[13] would go into a bank account. 
[it] Q: When you became 21 were you given access to the 
[15] money that had accumulated in that bank account? 
[16] A: Yes, things were turned over to me. 
[17] Q: How much was in the bank acconn* -.\ -
[18] 21? 
IM9] A: Not much. 
112ni Q: Do you recall approximately? 
I I A: It was next to nothing. 
hivi Q: So you would have turned 21 in 1973? 
I [23| A: 7 5 . 
I [24] Q: After y o u t u r n e d 21 d o y o u recal l ge t t ing 
[25] payments from Bill or Ruth or Ruell Investment? 
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jj A: Ruell, we did get payments. 
[2] Q: Do you recall approximately how much they would 
[3] have been? 
[4] A: It seems like it would be about $250 or $300. 
[5] It's kind of confusing because we were getting other pay11lei 
[6] from the Ben F. Charlesworth Trust, but as I recall it was 
7] about $250 or $300. 
I a] Q: Do you recall why you were receiving payments 
[9] from the Ben F. Charlesworth Trust? 
[1 o] A: Just as part of being his grandchild. All of us, 
111] children and grandchildren, his children and his 
[12] grandchildren were in for the same amount. 
[13] Q: Do you recall when the last time you received any 
[U] money from Ruell Investment would have been? 
[15] A: To the best of my knowledge I really can't recall 
[16] getting any monies after my father died in '85. And then I 
[17] was thinking about it a little and there might have been one 
[is] time from there to the present where we got like a $50 check 
[19] with a note saying something like we had to disburse a little 
[20] bit out of your partnership - what do they call those, 
[21] capital account or whatever. 
122] Q: Do you recall ever receiving income tax forms, 
[23] what maybe were designated as Schedule K-l's or similar type 
[24] of documents from Ruell Investment or their accountants? 
[25] A: Yes, we received K-l 's up until - '92 was the 
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[I] last K-l we got. So that would have been in '93, the tax 
[2] year. That was the last I recall of K-l's. 
[3] Q: You don't recall getting any since then? 
[4] A: No, I don't. 
[5] Q: And you don't recall receiving any money from 
[6] Ruell Investment except maybe once or twice in a very small 
[7] amount since your father's death? 
[8] A: Correct. 
[9] Q: And he passed " 
[io] A: August of'85. 
[i i] Q: Have you ever had any discussions sin.ce you 
[12] turned 21 discussions with Bill or Ruth Reyns regarding the 
[13] apartments? 
[14] A: Yes, I believe it would have been 1994 and it was i 
[15] probably after August actually because I do extensions on my 
[16] income tax. So I called Ruth I believe it would have been in 
[17] '94 and I said I haven't received a K-l and I need to file my 
[18] taxes. 
[19] Q: What was her response? 
[20] A: Her response was the trust is * - n 
[21 j to an attorney and it's over. 
[22] Q: What did you take that to mean? 
[23] A: I took it to mean there may be trouble in 
[24] paradise. 
[25] Q: When was that conversation? 
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[1] A: I believe it would have been like September of 
[2] 1994. 
[3] Q: Following that you never received any further 
[4] money. Would that be fair to say? 
[5] A: Yes, definitely fair to say. 
[6] Q: And never received any f11 ix 
[7] information? 
[83 A: No, no more information. 
[9] Q: Were you ever asked to make any contributions to 
[10] the partnership if there was a shortfall or anything like 
[11] 'that? 
[121 A: I was never asked to make any contributions to 
i;i 3] the partnership. 
[H] Q: Did you ever have any understanding that someone 
[15] had paid your grandfather for these apartments? 
[16] A: Yes, it was always our understanding that Ruell 
[17] would collect the rents and pay the contract, mortgage or 
[18] whatever it was. 
[19] Q: Do you have any understanding whether there was a 
[20] balance due to your grandfather at the time he died? 
[21] A: Yes, I think there was still money owed at the 
[22] time of his death in '72. 
[23] Q: Do you have an understanding to whom that 
[24] remaining balance was paid? 
[25] A: I think I recall through the grapevine that my 
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[1] dad was getting a little bit. I'm not sure if he was getting 
[2] all of the lump sum or a portion of the lump sum. But I 
[3] think my dad did end up getting a little bit every month off 
[4] of it. 
[5] Q: What do you base that knowledge on? 
[6] A: Just my dad telling me. A conversation with my 
[7] dad. I may be confused, but I believe that to be correct. 
[8] Q: That's your best recollection at this time? 
[9] A: Right. 
[10] Q: When did you first become awar< • 11 • n i 11 
[11] apartments in Ogden had been sold? 
[12] MR. BERGER: He's asking when. 
[13] THE WITNESS: Probably about seven, eight months 
[14] ago. 
[15] Qi (By Mr. Smith) So that would have been the 
[16] summer of 1997? 
[17] A: '97, yes. 
[18] Q: How did you become aware of that? 
[19] A: We had inquired with the attorneys and started 
[20] looking into things and that's when I became aware they had 
[21] been sold. 
[22] Q: When you say inquired with the attorneys, you 
[23] mean Mr. Berger? 
[24] A: It was Thomas Mecham is who I was working with. 
[25] Q: But attorneys from the firm of Ray, Quinney & 






[2] A: Correct. 
[3] Q: That's information that you learned through them? 
[4] A: Correct. 
[5] Q: Let me show you the complaint, amended complaint 
[6] that was filed in this action, Mr. Charlesworth. Have you 
[7] had an opportunity to review this document previously? 
[8] A: I have looked this document over. 
[9] Q: Are you familiar with the contents of it? 
[10] A: Yes. 
[i 11] Q: Could I have you turn to paragraph 74? 
[12] A: Okay. 
[13] Q: Could you read 74? 
[14] A; The acts and omissions of Arie William Reyns, 
[15] Ruth Reyns and Alan W. Reyns were made either intentionally 
[16] or recklessly by them with an intent to induce Shirlie 
[17] Charlesworth and plaintiffs to refrain from asserting their 
[18] rights and privileges under the partnership agreement and the 
[19] Charlesworth Trust of which agreements Arie William Reyns, 
[20] Ruth Reyns and Alan W. Reyns were aware. 
[21] Q: Can you explain to me -
[22] MRS. CHARLESWORTH: Alan W. Reyns? 
[23] THE WITNESS: That's young Bill. 
[24] Q: (By Mr. Smith) Could you describe for me, 
[25] Mr. Charlesworth, what specifically you believe thos 
Page 
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[i] Q: Can you tell me in that paragraph is there 
[2] anything other than what you've just told me that you believe 
[3] they did to intentionally hinder or delay you from acting? 
[4] MR. BERGER: I'll.object to the extent that calls 
[5] for a legal conclusion. The document speaks for itself. The 
[6] witness can testify as to his understanding. 
[; J THE WITNESS: Well, they never let us know about 
[8] the sale of the apartments either which definitely hindered 
[9] things, between no quitclaim deed and not telling us about 
mo] the apartment selling. 
[11J Q: (By Mr. Smith) After the time you became 21 
[12] years old, Mr. Charlesworth, did you ever request an 
[13] accounting other than in this lawsuit you filed from Ruell 
[14] Investment Company or anyone associated with it? 
[15] A: I personally did not. 
[16] Q: Do you know whether an} :: 1") our I: r athei s c r 
[17] sisters did? 
[1 a] Ai I believe my sister GayLee wrote a letter to them. 
[19] asking for an accounting. 
[20] Q: Do you know when that would have been? 
[21] A: I think it was 1988.1 never saw it though. 
[22] Q: Do you know what prompted that? 
[23] A: Just the fact that we kept getting every year 
[24] something saying the boiler broke, we don't have any money, 
[25] we can't rent them out or needed a new roof or something like 
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[1] that. 
(2) Q: Those things wou 
[3] getting to be reduced? 
A: Reduced or nonexistent 
[5] Q: Do you know whether GayLee got any response? 
[6] A: The only response I think there was was a very 
[7] curt letter to all of us that year saying that one of us had 
[8] questioned the integrity of Ruth and Bill and they were you 
[9] could tell a little bit upset.That's really all I recall is 
[10] a paragraph on a Christmas card or something like that. 
Q: Do you recall receiving any financial 
[12] information? 
[13] A: No, they never - the only financial information 
[14] we ever received were the K-l forms. 
[15] MR. SMITH: Art, could I just ask you to ask 
[16] GayLee if she has that letter and if so produce it? 
[17] MRS. CHARLESWORTH: She doesn't. 
[18] THE WITNESS: She doesn't have it any longer. 
[19] I've already asked her about that. 
[20] MR. BERGER: I'll follow up an I 
[21] will get that to you. 
[221 MR. SMITH: That's fine. If she doesn't have it 
[23] that's fine. 
[24] Q: (By Mr. Smith) Do you know, Mr. Charlesworth, if 
[25] any of your other siblings have had any similar contacts with 
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[1] individuals did to prevent you from acting or to induce you 
[2] not to exercise your rights under those various documents? 
[3] MR. BERGER: To the extent you're calling for a 
[4] legal conclusion I'll object, but the witness can testify as 
[5] to his understanding. 
[6] THE WITNESS: My understanding is that 
[7] technically Ruth and Bill or whoever was in charge was 
[8] supposed to actually every year give us some kind of an 
[9] accounting of the partnership which never happened. So we 
[10] were kind of always in the dark. Also through the chain of 
[11] event of things that have happened in the last eight or 12 
[12] months I believe that Ruth Reyns picked up a quitclaim deed 
[13] to my mother and it was never delivered to any of us. We 
[14] were never aware of it. So I believe we were kept in the 
[15] dark and that is how they tried to keep us from doing 
[16] anything. 
[17] Q: (By Mr. Smith) Turn to paragraph 79 
[18] A: Okay. 
[19] Q: And if you would read that one? 
[20] A: The afore mentioned acts, representations and 
[21] omissions were made by Ruth Reyns with actual intent to 
[22] delay, defraud or hinder Shirlie Charlesworth and plaintiffs 
[23] from asserting their rights and privileges under the 
[24] partnership agreement and the Charlesworth Truth all in 
[25] violation of Utah Code ANN-25-6-1. 
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